The standard Bayesian story goes something like this: probabilities represent a rational agent's degrees of belief. When the agent learns something new she conditions on it, meaning that she updates her probabilities according to Bayes' rule. Importantly, the interpretation of the probability function is that it represents the agent's degrees of belief about how likely… Continue reading Paper Review: New Semantics for Bayesian Inference: The Interpretive Problem
Tag: statistics
Paper Review: Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics
One of the more interesting things I've learned in my life is that our best account of epistemology is that rational beliefs are governed by the probability axioms. Furthermore, there is a specific way in a rational agent updates her beliefs given new evidence---Bayesian conditionalization. Of course there is disagreement on this. At this point… Continue reading Paper Review: Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics
Paper Review: “Antiscience Zealotry”? Values, Epistemic Risk, and the GMO Debate
From climate change to vaccinations to the shape of the Earth (???!?!), scientific claims are often in dispute. Indeed, when encountering people who hold views against the (scientific) norm, we often think of them as "anti-scientific." Of course, the people who hold these views don't think they are being irrational. They think their position is… Continue reading Paper Review: “Antiscience Zealotry”? Values, Epistemic Risk, and the GMO Debate
The Crow's Nest 