Paper Review: Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability

Readers of the blog will know that I am a fan of the Bayesian approach to probability. This approach is also sometimes called "personal probability", because it takes probabilities to be the degrees of belief (or credences) of rational agents. We can think of using probability like this as a framework for managing uncertainty in… Continue reading Paper Review: Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability

Paper Review: Why Conditionalize?

How should we change our beliefs in the light of new information? This is one of the central questions of epistemology, and has great practical importance. For example, consider a doctor who has a patient who is concerned he might have cancer. The doctor has certain beliefs: for example, she may think that her patient… Continue reading Paper Review: Why Conditionalize?

Paper Review: “Antiscience Zealotry”? Values, Epistemic Risk, and the GMO Debate

From climate change to vaccinations to the shape of the Earth (???!?!), scientific claims are often in dispute. Indeed, when encountering people who hold views against the (scientific) norm, we often think of them as "anti-scientific." Of course, the people who hold these views don't think they are being irrational. They think their position is… Continue reading Paper Review: “Antiscience Zealotry”? Values, Epistemic Risk, and the GMO Debate

Paper Review: Bayes, Bounds, and Rational Analysis

Bayesian learning and decision theory (arguably) characterize rationality for idealized agents. However, carrying out Bayesian calculations can often be costly. In particular, the kind of agent one is--whether a human, lizard, or computer--constrains the kind of information processing one can do. This gestures towards a question: what is the relationship between idealized rationality and rationality… Continue reading Paper Review: Bayes, Bounds, and Rational Analysis